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THE SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN YOUR CAR ACT: WILL IT
ACTUALLY PROTECT YOU?
Benjamin L. Bollinger*
On July 21, 2015, in light of emerging technology involving
autonomous driving vehicles, the United States Senate proposed
Senate Bill 1806, or the Security and Privacy in Your Car Act, to
address issues surrounding these technologies. The “SPY Car Act”
attempts to address issues surrounding cybersecurity, data
privacy, and hacking of autonomous driving vehicles. The Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is currently
analyzing the SPY Car Act. If enacted, this bill could pave the way
for the autonomous driving vehicle industry to be effectively
regulated. Although this bill has its shortcomings, it is a good start
to the conversation regarding the privacy and security concerns
associated with autonomous driving vehicles.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
For most drivers who have sat steaming in rush hour traffic or
wished they could catch up on work instead of driving in to the
office, self-driving cars may be an enticing option. With the
emergence of these vehicles, the concerns over vehicle safety, data
security, data privacy, and regulation are at the forefront of the
minds of industry and government actors. This Recent
Development analyzes the Security and Privacy in Your Car Act
(“SPY Car Act”), a bill before Congress that seeks to govern
cybersecurity and privacy aspects of self-driving vehicles, and
examines how this legislation will address the concerns
surrounding this emerging technology.
Autonomous driving vehicles, also known as self-driving
vehicles, are on the verge of becoming an everyday sight on roads.1
While these vehicles would definitely provide drivers with many
advantages,2 they also come with considerable risks and liabilities.3
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2018. I would
like to thank Professor Anne Klinefelter and the North Carolina Journal of Law
and Technology for all of their help with this article.
1
BI Intelligence, Ten Million Self-Driving Cars Will Be on the Road by 2020,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 15, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/report-10million-self-driving-cars-will-be-on-the-road-by-2020-2015-5-6 (stating that by
the year 2020 there will be close to 10 million vehicles on the road that will have
some sort of self-driving technology incorporated within the vehicle).
2
See Dan McLaughlin, 17 Ways Driverless Cars Could Change America,
THE FEDERALIST (July 16, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/07/16/17-waysdriverless-cars-could-change-america/ (listing fewer car accidents, changing of
traffic patterns, changing the insurance and legal culture, and changing the
layout of cities as the many effects of self-driving vehicles).
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Cybersecurity and privacy risks have the potential to delay, or even
break, the self-driving vehicle industry.4 Although it may be the
industry’s intention to put the safest and most reliable vehicles on
the road, the federal government must implement regulations to
protect consumers and govern this emerging and complex
technology.
Cybersecurity and data privacy are some of the most
significant areas of concern arising from self-driving vehicles.
These apprehensions stem from the knowledge that self-driving
vehicles will rely on some combination of Internet-based
communication systems to operate the vehicles without the control
of a human driver. 5 Furthermore, because these vehicles will
invariably be connected to the Internet, there are risks that the
wireless connection could be breached and the vehicles’ operating
system could be interfered with or sensitive personal data being
transmitted over the connection could be stolen.6
While it may seem that cybersecurity and data privacy are
intermingled issues, they must be viewed as separate and distinct.7
The SPY Car Act’s definition of cybersecurity includes differing
elements that must be distinguished from the definition of data

3

See Tia Ghose, Self-Driving Cars: 5 Problems That Need Solutions, LIVE
SCIENCE (May 14, 2015), http://www.livescience.com/50841-future-ofdriverless-cars.html.
4
RAND Corporation, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR
POLICYMAKERS 94 (2016) (stating that the privacy concerns surrounding
autonomous vehicles “could potentially derail the business”).
5
Id. at XIX–XXII (explaining how these vehicles could potentially rely on
“cloud-based resources,” “vehicle to vehicle” communication (“V2V”), “vehicle
to infrastructure” communication (“V2I”), GPS technology, and “inertial
navigation systems (“INS”). This report also states that software upgrades for
the vehicle over the Internet may also pose problems for the industry.
6
Id. at 6. (stating “Internet-connected systems might be hacked by the
malicious.”).
7
It is important to delineate the two terms because of the tendency to confuse
them. A breach of cybersecurity can be viewed as a breach of privacy, and a
breach of privacy can be viewed as a breach of cybersecurity. However, the SPY
Car Act uses specific language to show what is included under each definition,
and this Recent Development will adhere to those definitions.

APRIL 2017]

Your Car Act

217

privacy. 8 Cybersecurity is defined by the SPY Car Act as
protection against hacking of all “entry points to the electronic
systems of each motor vehicle.”9 “Entry points” into the vehicle
are any wireless or wired connection through which “control
signals” travel or a connection through which data can be
“accessed directly or indirectly.”10 The SPY Car Act also relates
cybersecurity to the protection of “software systems that can affect
the driver’s control of the vehicle movement.”11
Conversely, the SPY Car Act defines data privacy much more
narrowly. Here, data privacy is limited to notice, transparency,
consumer control, and limitation on the use of data collected by
manufacturers. 12 These definitions clearly delineate between the
two terms. The definition of cybersecurity used in the SPY Car Act
refers to two things: (1) the protection against malicious
interference with the self-driving vehicle’s operability;13 and (2)
unauthorized access to or interception of driving data.14 On the
other hand, the definition of data privacy refers to what
manufacturers can and cannot do with harvested driving data and
the right of the consumers to that data.15
8

Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. (2015).
The SPY Car Act’s definition of cybersecurity can be split into two separate
elements: protection against an attempt to take control of the vehicle’s driving
ability and protection against stealing or intercepting of driving data. The data
privacy definition speaks to the scenario where the manufacturer is mining data
and what they can do with it and what rights the consumer has to the mining and
use of the data.
9
Id. at 3.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 2.
12
Id. at 8–11.
13
This is evidenced by the inclusion of the “protection against hacking”
language and while someone may hack driving data the Senate also includes that
hacking can be unauthorized access to the “electronic controls” of the vehicle.
See id. at 3.
14
This is evidenced by the inclusion of “unauthorized access to . . . driving
data” in the definition of “hacking” and the “protection against hacking”
provision and the “security of collected information” section of the
cybersecurity standards portion. See Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of
2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. 3 (2015).
15
Id. at 8–11.
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The difference between cybersecurity and data privacy is
further illustrated by the differing risks of harm from breaches. An
example of a cybersecurity breach is where a vehicle’s operating
system is hacked.16 In such instances, a hacker may be able to “take
over the brakes, engine, or other components of a person’s car.”17
This is concerning because such breaches of security could result
in serious bodily injury or death. However, in the event of a
privacy breach, where a driver’s personal data are vulnerable, the
consequences could have other impacts on the consumer.18 The
data retained by vehicle manufacturers are so sensitive, if a
consumer’s data privacy is breached and the information is
transferred to an unauthorized third party, the third party could
potentially track a consumer’s whereabouts, anticipate a
consumer’s movements, or potentially implicate a consumer by
leaking proof of illegal conduct based on a consumer’s
movement. 19 This could lead to reputational harms, loss of
employment, and loss of liberty.20
Cybersecurity and privacy standards for self-driving vehicles
are still evolving.21 The U.S. Department of Transportation has
recognized the fact that no standards exist for self-driving vehicle
16

See Kevin Collier, How Easy is it to Hack A Self-Driving Car?, VOCATIV
(June 29, 2016), http://www.vocativ.com/332734/driverless-car-hack/.
17
Tom Simonite, Your Future Self-Driving Car Will Be Way More Hackable,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Jan.
26,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/546086/your-future-self-driving-car-willbe-way-more-hackable/. See also Alex Hern, Car Hacking Is the Future—
and Sooner Or Later You’ll Be Hit, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/28/car-hacking-future-selfdriving-security.
18
See infra note 48.
19
See generally Mathew Gillespie, Shifting Automotive Landscapes: Privacy
and the Right to Travel in the Era of the Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 50 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 147 (2016) (discussing the potential privacy risks inherent in
autonomous driving vehicles).
20
See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology,
11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151 (1995) (discussing how
intelligent transportation technology can potentially affect the privacy rights of
consumers).
21
U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES
POLICY 21 (2016).

APRIL 2017]

Your Car Act

219

manufacturers to use to model their industry practices and that
“more research is necessary before proposing a regulatory
standard.” 22 The industry cannot mass-produce self-driving
vehicles until industry standards and federal regulations exist.23
These standards and regulations are important to mass-production
because of the potential for widespread harm.
In response to these concerns, the U.S. Congress proposed the
SPY Car Act in July 2015.24 This Recent Development analyzes
the provisions of the SPY Car Act with existing data privacy
regulations and argues that the United States Senate has not
completely addressed every issue pertaining to self-driving
vehicles. Part II discusses the relevant law in the arena of privacy
regulation. Part III elaborates on the SPY Car Act and the issues it
addresses, such as “hacking,” “cybersecurity standards,” “cyber
dashboard,” and “privacy standards,”25 with a particular focus on
the privacy provisions. Part IV analyzes the privacy provisions of
the SPY Car Act and whether a particular provision will help to
reconcile privacy concerns. Finally, Part V suggests
recommendations for how the SPY Car Act can be improved to
better address the issue of privacy surrounding self-driving
vehicles.
II.
RELEVANT PRIVACY LAW
Before discussing relevant privacy law, it is important to note
the federal entities that will play a pivotal role in governing
vehicles of this nature. Because the regulation of these vehicles
will involve two separate forms of governance, the actual vehicle
itself and the Internet-based operational features, the SPY Car Act
requires the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to consult
with each other before issuing any regulations.26 First, the U.S.
Department of Transportation (“DOT”), through the NHTSA,
22

Id.
RAND, supra note 4.
24
Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. (2015).
25
Id. at 3–11.
26
Id. at 5–7, 10–11.
23
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governs all road vehicles within the United States.27 The NHTSA
has the power to promulgate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (“FMVSS”) with which vehicle manufacturers must
certify compliance.28 Furthermore, even with the lack of FMVSS
standards for self-driving vehicles, 29 the NHTSA still has the
“authority to identify safety defects, allowing the [NHTSA] to
recall vehicles or equipment that pose an unreasonable risk to
safety.”30 This is important because it creates a potential safeguard
against defective and dangerous vehicles being operated while the
federal government is still trying to issue regulations for these new
vehicles.
In addition, with the high degree of wireless technologies31 in
self-driving vehicles, the FTC will be a major player that will need
to work in conjunction with the NHTSA to achieve strong
regulations for self-driving vehicles.32 The FTC will operate in a
consulting capacity for cybersecurity standards 33 and cyber
dashboard 34 rulemaking and will hold primary rulemaking
authority on the privacy standards35 for self-driving vehicles.
27

49 U.S.C. § 105 (2016).
49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2016).
29
The current statutory definition for a motor vehicle does not include any
provision for self-driving vehicles. The current definition for “‘motor vehicle’
means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured
primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways [.]” See id. § 30102.
30
U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 7.
31
See Dorothy J. Glancy, Sharing the Road: Smart Transportation
Infrastructure, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1627–40 (2014) (discussing
connected vehicle technologies and how the USDOT “recognizes two main
categories or types of vehicular communications: (1) Connected Vehicles Safety
Systems that use Dedicated Short Range Communications (“DSRC”)
transceivers to send and receive vehicle status communications; and (2)
Connected Vehicle Mobility Applications that generally use cellular wireless to
send and receive a wide range of data, from the status of the vehicle, to
navigation assistance and infotainment”).
32
The U.S. Senate recognizes the importance of the FTC as a cohort in
formulating regulations, which is evidenced by the inclusion of the FTC in the
SPY Car Act. See Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th
Cong. 2, 5–8, 10–11 (2015).
33
Id. at 5.
34
Id. at 7. The “cyber dashboard” is essentially an affixed notice on a
manufactured vehicle which contains information for the consumer regarding
28
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As discussed previously, self-driving vehicles will rely on
some form of communication and operating technology that will
utilize the Internet.. 36 Because no current regulation establishes
privacy standards for these vehicles, this Recent Development will
analyze the SPY Car Act using the lens of the Fair Information
Practices (“FIPs”). The FIPs were created by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare “in response to growing use of
automated data systems containing information about
individuals.”37 The FIPs are highly influential guidelines in privacy
laws that have been cited by the FTC in relation to its regulatory
authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).
A. The Fair Information Practices
The FTC, considered a major actor in U.S. privacy regulation,
issued a report to Congress in 1998 that laid out what the FTC
called the “five core principles of privacy protection: (1)
Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation;
(4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.”38 Although,
historically, the United States’ privacy laws have not consistently
reflected these core principles,39 the “FIPs are important because
they provide the underlying policy for many national laws
addressing privacy and data protection matters.” 40 This section
analyzes the privacy portion of the SPY Car Act against the FIPs to
determine if the SPY Car Act will be successful in accomplishing
the measures the vehicle takes to protect the cybersecurity and privacy of the
vehicle and the consumer.
35
Id. at 10.
36
See RAND, supra note 4.
37
Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, 2 (Version
2.17 2016). See also Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, a report of
the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, July 1973 DHEW Publication
No. (OS) 73-94.
38
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress 7
(1998).
39
See Gellman, supra note 37, at 1 (“Privacy laws in the United States, which
are much less comprehensive in scope than laws in some other countries, often
reflect some elements of FIPs but not as consistently as the laws of most other
nations.”).
40
Id.
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its stated purpose. The following subsections will go into greater
detail on the five FIPs and will illustrate how each individual
principle is relevant to self-driving vehicle technology.
1.

Notice/Awareness
The first and “most fundamental principle” is notice. 41 The
FTC states “consumers should be given notice of an entity’s
information practices before any personal information is collected
from them.”42 This principle is relevant to self-driving cars because
of the high value of the information gathered by the vehicle and the
possibility that data obtained from the vehicle could potentially
contain personal data regarding the passengers.43 The FTC states
that “[w]ithout notice, a consumer cannot make an informed
decision as to whether and to what extent to disclose personal
information.” 44 A consumer’s decision to disclose personal
information might be made for them, without notice, as the nature
of the data collected by the vehicle will reveal some personal
information about the vehicle’s passengers.45
2.

Choice/Consent
The second FIP is consumer choice or consent. 46 The FTC
defines “choice” as “giving consumers options as to how any
personal information collected from them may be used.” 47 The
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy states that manufacturers
should “offer vehicle owners choices regarding the collection, use,
sharing, retention, and deconstruction of data, including
geolocation,48 biometric, and driver behavior data that could be
41

Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 7.
Id.
43
RAND, supra note 4, at 94. See also Gillespie, supra note 19.
44
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38.
45
Consumers want the ability to “use a personal smartphone to obtain data
for navigation, to have email read aloud to the driver, to send SMS (text)
messages by voice, and to have text messages read back aloud for the driver.”
Having all of this information stored in a vehicle shows how sensitive this data
could be. See RAND, supra note 4, at 82.
46
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 8.
47
Id.
48
Geolocation,
TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1935/geolocation (last visited Feb. 22,
42
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reasonably linked to them personally (i.e., personal data).”49 A
consumer’s choice as to how their driving data may be shared is
especially relevant to self-driving vehicles because many third
parties will be interested in the data.50
3.

Access/Participation
The third FIP is that consumers should have the “ability both to
access data about him or herself—i.e., to view the data in an
entity’s files—and to contest that data’s accuracy and
completeness.”51 This particular FIP is important for self-driving
vehicles because consumers should have access to the information
their vehicle is collecting about them. Consumers may want to
view what particular types of information are being gathered by the
vehicle to better inform their decision as to whether they want the
manufacturer to have control over their data or not. Furthermore,
the FTC addresses access and participation to make sure
consumers can correct data that is obtained from them.52 In regards
to self-driving vehicles, however, access and participation should
be viewed in a light that reflects the importance of a consumer’s
knowledge of the nature of the information gathered from them. It
is only through this light that consumers can make informed
decisions about whether they want the data retained from them or
not.

2017) (“Geolocation is the process of finding, determining and providing the
exact location of a computer, networking device, or equipment. It enables device
location based on geographical coordinates and measurements.”). In the selfdriving vehicle scenario, the consumer should have a choice as to whether the
manufacturer has the ability to tell exactly where the consumer’s vehicle is at all
times based on geographical information taken from the vehicles Global
Positioning System (“GPS”).
49
U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 19.
50
RAND, supra note 4, at 94 (stating that “insurance companies would be
interested in individual driving habits,” “retailers would be very interested in
attracting motorists to their locations,” and “law enforcement agencies [would]
have considerable interest in using such data”).
51
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 9.
52
Id.
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4.

Integrity/Security
The fourth FIP is “that data be accurate and secure.”53 The FTC
promulgates that to “assure data integrity,” data “collectors must
take reasonable steps, such as using only reputable sources of data
and cross-referencing data against multiple sources, providing
consumer access to data, and destroying untimely data or
converting it to anonymous form.”54 This definition is important
because it draws attention to the protection of data from hackers;
however it only speaks to information and does not address the
issue of security in regards to the software components of the
vehicle and the vehicle’s operating system. 55 The Federal
Automated Vehicles Policy suggests that the manufacturers should
take it upon themselves to ensure that they “follow a robust
product development process” that is designed to detect and adapt
to cybersecurity threats. 56 While precedent exists regarding the
protection of data within the vehicle, there is no established
standard for the quality of a vehicles’ cybersecurity against
infiltration.57
5.

Enforcement/Redress
The final FIP is enforcement and redress.58 This particular FIP
is important because without a means of enforcement, the other
FIPs would be worthless.59 The FTC states that there are different
ways for the FIPs to be enforced. 60 The industry could selfregulate, “legislation [could] create private remedies for
consumers,”61 or there could be “regulatory schemes enforceable
53

Id. at 10.
Id.
55
Id.
56
U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 21.
57
Id. (telling industry participants that they “should consider and incorporate
guidance, best practices, and design principles published by National Institute
for Standard and Technology (NIST), NHTSA, SAE International, the Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of Global Automakers, the
Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) and other relevant
organizations”).
58
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 10.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
54
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through civil and criminal sanctions.” 62 Enforcement is an
interesting issue in the current self-driving vehicle industry
because manufacturers are currently regulating their own vehicle
standards with little to no oversight by any level of government.63
The FTC recognizes that government enforcement is an option for
regulating the implementation of the FIPs and this is reflected in
the SPY Car Act.64
B. Federal Trade Commission Act
In response to an increased demand for regulation of unfair and
deceptive business practices,65 the United States Congress enacted
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).66 The FTC receives
its regulatory power from Section 5 of the FTCA,67 which allows
the FTC to “prevent” businesses “from using unfair methods of
62

Id.
Very few states have enacted some form of legislation to address the issues
of self-driving vehicles. Most states that have passed legislation deal with the
problem of defining a self-driving vehicle and authorizing this type of vehicle to
be operated on the roads within the states. See U.S. Department of
Transportation, supra note 21, at 41–52; see also, Autonomous Vehicles | SelfDriving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-drivingvehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (showing a
constantly updated list of every state that has passed legislation and every state
with proposed legislation regarding self-driving vehicles).
64
Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. 10
(2015) (“Enforcement—A violation of this section shall be treated as an unfair
and deceptive act or practice in violation of a rule prescribed under section
18(a)(1)(B).”).
65
See Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law,
PROSKUER ON PRIVACY, PLI (2006) (providing an in-depth history of the
evolution of privacy law and how the FTCA emerged based on the need to
regulate unfair and deceptive business practices).
66
See 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2012). See also Jeffrey H. Liebling, Judicial
Usurpation of the F.T.C.’s Authority: A Return to the Rule of Reason, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 283, 286 (1996) (explaining how “[t]he primary objective of
the F.T.C. Act was to create an administrative body with broad regulatory
authority to determine what business practices constituted unfair methods of
competition”).
67
15 U.S.C. § 45 is referred to as Section 5 of the FTCA because the FTCA
starts at § 41 making § 45 the fifth section.
63
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competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.”68 The ability to prevent
businesses from committing unfair and deceptive practices is
solely a reactive authority and does not give the FTC the power to
issue statutory regulations.69 The SPY Car Act, however, would
give the FTC the authority to issue regulations under the FTCA
pertaining to privacy standards and would make a violation of
these standards an “unfair and deceptive act or practice” under the
FTCA.70 This dual authority given to the FTC authorizes the FTC
to assume a role it historically has not embraced.71 Part IV will
analyze how this dual authority gives the FTC the power it needs
to effectively regulate the privacy standards for self-driving
vehicles.
1.

The FTC’s Authority Under Section 5 of the FTCA
If the FTC determines that a manufacturer has been deceptive
or has used unfair business practices, the FTC can bring an
enforcement action through filing a lawsuit in federal court.72 The
FTC, however, conducts the majority of their regulatory power
outside the purviews of the courts.73 In its role as a regulatory

68

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
The FTCA gives the FTC the authority to issue complaints against a
company who has violated its privacy policies. Id. The FTCA, however, does
not give the FTC the power to issue statutory regulations to which the
companies must conform their privacy practices. See id. at § 45(b).
70
The SPY Car Act states that the FTC will have the power to “prescribe
regulations . . . to carry out section 27” of the FTCA. Security and Privacy in
Your Car Act of 2015, S. 1806, 114th Cong. 10 (2015).
71
See Solove, supra note 65, at 39 (stating that the FTC, since 1998, has been
“bring[ing] civil actions and seek[ing] injunctive remedies”).
72
See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and
Law
Enforcement
Authority,
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last visited
March 4, 2017) [hereinafter Federal Trade Commission: A Brief Overview].
73
Id. Typically the only time companies refuse to settle and take the FTC to
court is when the company believes the FTC has overstepped the scope of its
statutory authority under Section 5 of the FTCA. See also Spencer Weber
Waller, Prosecution By Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1394–95 (1998) (explaining how the courts
have mostly taken on a “symbolic role” in overseeing the FTC in their
69
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agency, the FTC monitors the marketplace and responds to
complaints by initiating investigations, and if warranted, issues a
complaint “setting forth its charges.”74 If the accused company
continues to engage in the unlawful business practices or decides
to contest the charges against them, the complaint is adjudicated
and “a United States court of appeals may then enforce, modify or
discharge the F.T.C. ruling.” 75 It is difficult, however, for a
company to successfully challenge the FTC’s determination that
the activity the company engaged in was unfair or deceptive. If the
FTC’s findings are “supported by substantial evidence,” the court
should dismiss the challenge in favor of the FTC “even if the
finding is at variance with the position the court would have
taken.” 76 In other words, courts will not overturn a finding of
“unfair or deceptive” as long as the FTC has substantial evidence
to support their claim.77 If a company charged with violation of
Section 5 of the FTCA wants to challenge the finding by the FTC,
the company will usually challenge the FTC’s scope of authority
under the FTCA.78 This is important because self-driving vehicle
regulatory capacity and that the law “is determined in accordance with internal
guidelines rather than case law”).
74
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). See also What We Do, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 23,
2017) (“We [the FTC] conduct investigations, sue companies and people that
violate the law, develop rules to ensure a vibrant marketplace, and educate
consumers and businesses about their rights and responsibilities.”). See also
Federal Trade Commission: A Brief Overview, supra note 72.
75
Liebling, supra note 66, at 295.
76
Id. at 295–96 (citing Litton Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C., 676 F.2d 364, 368–69
(9th Cir. 1982)).
77
Id. at 294–96.
78
The key word is “wants” to challenge the FTC. Companies will settle with
the FTC out of court the majority of the time. See Enforcing Privacy Promises,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises (last visited
March 4, 2017) (showing how many companies have settled with the FTC in the
recent past). If a company does, however, want to challenge the finding of the
FTC, the form of the challenge will typically look like the defenses raised in
cases such as: LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., 776 F.3d 1275 (2015) (LabMD claiming
the FTC exceeded their statutory authority; 11th Circuit ruled in LabMD’s
favor); F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (2015) (determining
whether the FTC had authority to regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness
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manufacturers will be faced with complaints by the FTC if they
breach their cybersecurity and data privacy standards as evidenced
by the fact that the SPY Car Act makes a violation of the privacy
standards a violation of the FTCA.
2.
Application of the FTC’s Section 5 Authority to SelfDriving Vehicles
The FTC’s ability to effectively determine what is an unfair or
deceptive business practice is both developed by the FTC and
tested in the federal courts. The unfairness prong, however, versus
the deceptive prong, is currently the subject of controversy.79 The
FTC typically pursues what they have determined to be a breach of
cybersecurity under the unfairness prong while pursuing the breach
of a commitment to a stated privacy policy under the deceptive
prong.80 Therefore, if Congress is going to include the FTC in the
rulemaking process for cybersecurity and privacy standards in selfdriving vehicles then it may need to revisit the issue of the FTC’s
authority under the FTCA, particularly for cybersecurity. 81
Effective regulation of these self-driving vehicles will require the
FTC to monitor the companies manufacturing these vehicles to
assure that they are complying with their stated privacy policies
prong of Section 5 of the FTCA; ruled in favor of the FTC thereby expanding its
scope of authority under the FTCA to regulate cybersecurity). The trend of the
judiciary in FTC authority case decisions dates all the way back to the 1920s
when the U.S. Supreme Court was first faced with this authority question. The
Court issued a very strict interpretation of the FTC’s ability to determine what is
unfair and deceptive in F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). However, the
Court methodically chipped away at this ruling and broadened the FTC’s
authority until the 1980s where the Court once again ruled to restrict the scope
of the FTC’s authority. Liebling’s article argues the courts are restricting the
original intention of Congress in the FTCA and that the courts should look to
once again broadening the FTC’s authority and allowing them to act like the
regulatory agency they were designed to be. See Liebling, supra note 66, at 296313.
79
See Liebling, supra note 66, at 296–313. (discussing challenges to FTC
authority and how all of these recent challenges have come after the FTC has
tried to prosecute breach of cybersecurity standards under the unfairness prong
of the FTCA).
80
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 627–48 (2014).
81
See Liebling, supra note 66, at 313–18.
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and not allowing consumers data to be stolen. Without clarity
about the FTC’s ability to regulate self-driving vehicle
manufacturers under Section 5, the consumer is ultimately the one
who suffers because of the lack of oversight for manufacturers and
their practices.
The FTC, while not a rulemaking agency, has the ability to
play an important role in the regulation of self-driving vehicle
technology. The Senate included the FTC in the SPY Car Act to
help the NHTSA create effective regulations. In order to do so, the
NHTSA must account for the FIPs and the FTC’s own regulatory
authority under the FTCA.
III.
THE SPY CAR ACT OF 2015
Self-driving vehicles have created a unique problem for the
federal government because the U.S. Department of Transportation
has never encountered a technology with such a high degree of
autonomy. Since its inception “the U.S. Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) has been committed to saving lives and
improving safety and efficiency in every way Americans move
. . . .”82 This regulatory effort includes automobiles, which are “on
the cusp of a technological transformation.” 83 As discussed
previously, the current regulations on standard automobiles will
not be adequate for the future regulation of self-driving vehicles.84
The primary objective of the SPY Car Act is “[t]o protect
consumers from security and privacy threats to their motor
vehicles, and for other purposes.” 85 This will be achieved by
amending the current Title 49 powers of the DOT, NHTSA, and
FTC to regulate these self-driving vehicles.86 The SPY Car Act is
organized in a way that will amend the definitions section under 49
U.S.C. § 30102 to include crucial definitions that pertain to selfdriving cars.87 The SPY Car Act then breaks the issues into three
82

U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 5.
Id.
84
See RAND, supra note 4.
85
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 1.
86
See id.; 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1998).
87
See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 2–3 (defining “Administrator” as the
Administrator of the NHTSA; “Commission” as the FTC; “‘critical software
83
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categories: cybersecurity, 88 cyber dashboard, 89 and privacy
standards.90 This section details the SPY Car Act’s categories and
explains these sections’ importance and purpose.
A. Cybersecurity Standards
The SPY Car Act’s first main section is “Cybersecurity
standards.” 91 The cybersecurity section starts off by making a
definitive statement that “[a]ll motor vehicles manufactured for
sale in the United States . . . shall comply with the cybersecurity
standards set forth” in this section.92 The cybersecurity standards
with which these vehicles must comply consist of three separate
components: “protection against hacking,”93 “security of collected
information,” 94 and “detection, reporting, and responding to
hacking.”95 In addition to stating specific standards to which these
vehicles must comply, the cybersecurity standards section also

systems’ means software systems that can affect the driver’s control of the
vehicle movement”; “‘driving data’ include, but are not limited to, any
electronic information collected about—(A) a vehicle’s status, including, but not
limited to, its location or speed; and (B) any owner, lessee, driver, or passenger
of a vehicle”; “‘entry points’ include, but are not limited to, means by which –
(A) driving data may be accessed, directly or indirectly; or (B) control signals
may be sent or received either wirelessly or through wired connections”; and
“‘hacking’ means the unauthorized access to electronic controls or driving data,
either wirelessly or through wired connections”).
88
Id. at 3.
89
Id. at 6.
90
Id. at 8.
91
Id. at 3. As mentioned in the introduction, it is beyond the scope of this
Recent Development to analyze the cybersecurity standards portion of the SPY
Car Act from a technical perspective. However, it is worthwhile to touch on
what is said about cybersecurity standards within the SPY Car Act. The
cybersecurity portion of the SPY Car Act is a deep enough issue to warrant its
own recent development. The area of cybersecurity law is a very murky area of
the law and is still in the process of developing and evolving to meet the needs
of a rapidly changing technology industry.
92
Id.
93
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 3–4.
94
Id. at 4–5.
95
Id. at 5.
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calls for “penalties” of “not more than $5,000 for each violation”
of these regulations.96
The SPY Car Act gives the primary rulemaking authority for
cybersecurity standards to the NHTSA after consultation with the
FTC.97 It is this relationship between the NHTSA and the FTC that
makes the analysis of whether the SPY Car Act conforms to the
FTC’s reliance on the FIPs so important. These regulations in the
SPY Car Act do not necessarily inform the industry participants as
to the specific standards to which these cybersecurity measures
must comply. Rather, the SPY Car Act only specifies that each
manufactured vehicle must have some sort of protection against
hacking, and the vehicle must have measures to prevent
unauthorized access to the vehicle.98
B. Cyber Dashboard
The SPY Car Act’s “Cyber Dashboard” is a means of giving
notice to consumers of self-driving vehicles.99 A cyber dashboard
is a privacy policy notice affixed to the self-driving vehicle.100 The
features of the cyber dashboard must “inform consumers, through
an easy-to-understand, standardized graphic, about the extent to
which the motor vehicle protects the cybersecurity and privacy of
motor vehicle owners, lessees, drivers, and passengers.” 101 The
cyber dashboard must contain provisions “beyond the minimum
requirements set forth in” the cybersecurity portion of the SPY Car
Act and it must go beyond the requirements set forth “in section 27
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”102
This language contained in the SPY Car Act concerning notice
does not entirely entail the requirements promulgated in the
FIPs.103 Although the cyber dashboard does effectively give notice
as to how the vehicle will protect the privacy of the consumer, it
96

Id.
See id. at 3–6.
98
See id.
99
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 7.
100
Id. at 6–7.
101
Id. at 7.
102
Id.
103
See id. at 7–8.
97
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does not address the issues of consent, consumer access, or third
party access.104 While these issues are discussed in the Privacy
Standards portion of the SPY Car Act,105 the U.S. Senate should
look to including these requirements in the initial notice, the cyber
dashboard, so that consumers can be fully informed as to how their
data is being used and the rights the consumer has to this
disposition of their data.
C. Privacy Standards for Motor Vehicles
The final portion of the SPY Car Act concerns “Privacy
Standards for Motor Vehicles.”106 The purpose of this portion of
the SPY Car Act is not only to give the FTC the power to regulate
privacy standards and to issue statutory rules on privacy standards,
but also to provide a framework for privacy standards to which
self-driving vehicle manufacturers may be held. These standards
incorporate the FIPs by using “transparency,” “consumer control,”
and “limitations on use of personal driving information.”107 The
SPY Car Act defines “transparency” as the “vehicle [providing]
clear and conspicuous notice, in clear and plain language, to the
owners or lessees of such vehicle of the collection, transmission,
retention, and use of driving data collected from such motor
vehicle.”108 The SPY Car Act defines “consumer control” as the
ability of the consumer to opt-out of “the collection and retention
of driving data” without losing “access to navigation tools or other
features or capabilities, to the extent technically possible.”109 The
SPY Car Act also states that a “manufacturer (including an original
equipment manufacturer) may not use any information collected by
a motor vehicle for advertising or marketing purposes without the
affirmative express consent by the owner or lessee” unless
provided with the owner’s consent.110

104

See id. at 7.
See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–11.
106
Id. at 8.
107
Id. at 8–11.
108
Id. at 8.
109
Id. at 8–9.
110
Id. at 9–10.
105
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These provisions within the SPY Car Act accurately reflect the
FIPs by requiring self-driving vehicle manufacturers to take the
necessary steps to fully inform the consumer as to how their data is
being used and giving the consumer control over their data.111
These provisions are crucial for the effective regulation of selfdriving vehicles because they allow a consumer to dictate how
their data can be used.
Overall, the language of the SPY Car Act produces regulations
that will effectuate the necessary regulation of self-driving
vehicles. The SPY Car Act’s most valuable tool is that it sets a
solid groundwork that the NHTSA and the FTC can use to further
promulgate rules. The next part further analyzes the provisions of
the SPY Car Act and determines whether they are adequate as
compared to existing privacy standards.
IV.

WILL THE SPY CAR ACT HELP RESOLVE THE LEGAL
ISSUES SURROUNDING PRIVACY IN A SELF-DRIVING CAR?

With so much talk about the concerns surrounding vehicle
cybersecurity and privacy, the question now becomes, will the
SPY Car Act help to alleviate these concerns? The purpose of the
SPY Car Act is not only to provide rules and regulations for selfdriving vehicles, but also to allocate rule-making authority to the
NHTSA in conjunction with the FTC.112 It is through this lens that
the analysis of the provisions of the SPY Car Act will take place.
While there may be portions of the SPY Car Act that could use
some bolstering, the NHTSA and the FTC have the opportunity to
compensate for any shortcomings by continuing to analyze the
needs of the industry and consumers and reflecting that in the final
rules published by both entities. Subsection A will analyze the
cyber dashboard, notice requirements, and transparency against the
FIPs and will argue for more transparency in the initial notice
requirement. Subsection B will analyze the limitations on the use
of driving data by manufacturers and how the requirements align
with the current practices within the self-driving vehicle industry.
Subsection C will scrutinize the authority given to the FTC through
111
112

See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–11.
Id. at 5–11.
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the SPY Car Act to regulate privacy practices and how this aligns
with the current ability of the FTC to regulate the industry.
Subsection D will analyze the statutory rulemaking process that the
FTC will be required to use and whether that process will be
adequate in obtaining valuable input from consumers. Subsection
E will address the lack of private remedies associated with
companies’ breach of their policy agreements and how the SPY
Car Act has addressed this issue.
A. Notice and Transparency
The “cyber dashboard,” or an affixed notice on the vehicle, and
the notice requirement contained in the privacy standards, are
effective regulations contained within the SPY Car Act.113 The
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy suggests a notice
requirement, 114 and the FTC requires notice be given to
consumers. 115 Thus, the SPY Car Act’s requirement for
manufacturers to give their customers notice is a step in the right
direction. The notice requirement also will likely meet FTC
standards because of the additional requirements of transparency,
control, and limitations on the use, collection, and retention of the
personal data.116 These requirements are consistent with the FIPs
and should be effective in stemming some of the concerns over
data privacy within these vehicles.
There is an argument to be made, however, that notice of a
manufacturer’s privacy practices will not be effective enough to
ensure that consumers are fully informed about companies’
practices and the level of protection of the data. 117 Tesla’s
Customer Privacy Policy is a great example of a privacy notice
given to consumers of self-driving vehicles.118 While it can be
113

Id. at 6–8.
U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 19.
115
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 7.
116
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–11.
117
See generally Paula J. Bruening & Mary J. Culnan, Through a Glass
Darkly: From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
515 (2016).
118
Tesla, Legal: Customer Privacy Policy, https://www.tesla.com/about/legal
(last visited Feb. 24, 2017).
114
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argued that Tesla should be lauded for its detailed privacy notice, it
is unlikely that the average consumer will understand the lengthy
legal document. 119 The SPY Car Act requires that “easy-tounderstand”120 language be used in the cyber dashboard feature and
that consumers should be given “clear and conspicuous notice.”121
This provision will force manufacturers to trim down the
complicated language and will help consumers better understand
the privacy implications of self-driving vehicles.
The FTC will need to closely monitor privacy policies to
ensure that the industry is conforming to the standards contained in
the SPY Car Act. The SPY Car Act incorporates the FIPs by
requiring straightforward language in privacy notices and those
requirements will, in theory, diminish the amount of complicated
language consumers will be forced to read. In reality, however, this
regularly will not be the case because manufacturers have an
interest in covering all aspects of legality and liability, which
results in overly technical and detailed privacy notices. 122
Therefore, the FTC needs to take this into account in their proposal
for rulemaking for privacy standards. In addition to the FTC’s
ability to intervene when a company has not complied with its own
stated privacy policy,123 the FTC must safeguard consumers from
convoluted privacy notices by enforcing the cyber dashboard and
privacy provisions laid out in the SPY Car Act.

119

See id. (“Telematics log data: To improve our vehicles and services for
you, we may collect certain telematics data regarding the performance, usage,
operation, and condition of your Tesla vehicle, including the following: e.g.,
vehicle identification number; speed information; odometer readings; battery use
management information; battery charging history; electrical system functions;
software version information; infotainment system data; safety-related data and
camera images.”) This lengthy description covers only one facet of the
information Tesla retains. The average consumer probably would not notice that
information regarding your “infotainment” is collected. See also Bruening &
Culnan, supra note 117, at 526–29.
120
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 7.
121
Id. at 8.
122
Bruening & Culnan, supra note 117, at 543.
123
Solove, supra note 65, at 39.
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B. Limitations on Use of Driving Data
Another regulation that would create a solid foundation from
which the NHTSA and FTC could work is the limitation on the use
of the collected driving data.124 With constant Internet connection,
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) like Verizon, AT&T, IBM, and
Google will have access to the personal data generated by selfdriving vehicles.125 These ISPs will provide the Internet broadband
on which self-driving vehicle technology will rely, 126 thus
introducing yet another party who has access to the information
gathered from the vehicle and transmitted over broadband. While
the SPY Car Act regulations may limit the manufacturer’s use of
data, there is an open question as to what choices a consumer has
regarding the information retained by ISPs. Although the SPY Car
Act does not speak directly to this question, the FTC does have
advisory authority and should seek to apply the FIPs to all parties
involved in self-driving vehicle operation.127
While this may seem like a vulnerability, the SPY Car Act
shows that it is aware of the concern over secondary uses of
personal information.128 The language included in the SPY Car Act
limiting a manufacturer’s use of personal driving data has the
regulations moving in the right direction.129 While Congress does
124

SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 9–10.
See RAND, supra note 4, at 158 (stating how self-driving vehicle “security
needs to be in the ‘cloud’” and noting that “only a cloud-based solution could
manage all of the media and data involved in” a self-driving vehicle).
126
See id. at 82 (explaining that in order for self-driving vehicles to operate
effectively on a horizontal communications platform there needs to be 3
components that work together: “(1) the car, (2) the technology brought into the
car, and (3) the Internet ‘cloud’”).
127
The FTC states that “choice relates to secondary uses of information—i.e.,
uses beyond those necessary to complete the contemplated transaction.” The
FTC also states that one secondary use of this information could be “transfer of
information to third parties.” See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at
8.
128
See SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 8–10. This is evidenced by the fact that
the SPY Car Act includes language giving the consumer control over the
“collection and retention of driving data” and the fact that the SPY Car Act also
limits manufacturers as to what they can do with the data without express
consent from the consumer.
129
See id.
125

APRIL 2017]

Your Car Act

237

effectively establish limitations on use of information by the
manufacturer, Congress should seek to include strong language in
the SPY Car Act that gives the FTC authority to govern
information sharing with every potential party involved in the
operation of a self-driving vehicle.130 That the SPY Car Act does
not address the idea that an Internet medium may have access to
consumer information shows the need for additional language
consistent with the choice/consent FIP where the consumer has the
option to restrict information access to all parties.131
The privacy policy used by Tesla gives some insight in to how
current manufacturers are addressing information sharing. 132
Tesla’s privacy policy aligns with the provisions of the SPY Car
Act in that it says that they “do not share information that
personally identifies you [the consumer] with unaffiliated third
parties for their marketing purposes unless you [the consumer] opt
in to that sharing.” 133 This language is consistent with the
limitations imposed by the SPY Car Act.134 The FTC, however,
uses stronger language in the FIPs that suggests manufacturers, or
any company retaining consumer information, should not share
any consumer information to any secondary entity without consent
from the consumer. 135 It may not be feasible, as self-driving

130

See SPY Car Act, supra note 8. The FTC, through its rulemaking capacity
under the SPY Car Act, needs to work with consumers and the industry so they
can anticipate what these “secondary uses” could take the form of. This may
come to light as self-driving vehicle technologies become more sophisticated,
however, the FTC should strive to identify potential additional entities that may
need governance.
131
See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 8.
132
Tesla, supra note 118.
133
Id.
134
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 9.
135
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 8–9 (explaining how
“secondary uses can be internal, such as placing the consumer on the collecting
company’s mailing list in order to market additional products or promotions, or
external, such as transfer of information to third parties”). The FTC also speaks
to a system of allowing consumers to “opt-in” or “opt-out” of having their data
retained with the ability of the consumer to specifically “tailor the nature of the
information they reveal and the uses to which it will be put.” Id. The FTC also
states that in the online realm, choice can be easily “exercised by simply
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technology is new and evolving, to completely restrict
manufacturers such as Tesla from sharing information about their
drivers.136 Tesla’s privacy policy, however, includes provisions that
appear vague and would leave a consumer wondering with whom
their data is being shared. 137 Because of these vague terms
contained in privacy policies coupled with the need for
manufacturers to have the ability to data share, the FTC, through
its rulemaking authority needs to strive to create a data sharing
system that works for both consumers and manufacturers. Taking
into account the FIPs and the Federal Autonomous Vehicle Policy
Guidance, the FTC should create a system where the consumer can
specifically tailor the data they wish to be shared and
manufacturers are required to de-identify the data even when
shared with other parties.138
C. Enforcement Authority Given to the FTC Under the FTCA
The SPY Car Act gives the FTC primary rulemaking authority
for privacy standards and makes a violation of the privacy
standards “an unfair and deceptive act or practice” under the
FTCA.139 Giving this type of dual authority provides the FTC with
the requisite tools to effectively regulate the privacy standards in
self-driving vehicles. This provision of the SPY Car Act is
clicking a box on the computer screen that indicates a user’s decision with
respect to the use and/or dissemination of the information being collected.” Id.
136
See U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 18 (suggesting a
system of anonymous data sharing that would promote “data sharing to enhance
and extend safety benefits . . . [s]uch shared data would help to accelerate
knowledge and understanding of HAV performance, and could be used to
enhance the safety of HAV [self-driving vehicle] systems and to establish
consumer confidence in [self-driving vehicle technologies]”).
137
See Tesla, supra note 118 (stating that Tesla “may share information with
our service providers and business partners when necessary to perform services
on our or on your behalf” with no mention of whether you have control over
these disclosures”). Tesla also lays out a list of “third party service providers and
channel partners” with whom they may share information. Id. Tesla does give an
opt-in option for certain types of third parties, however, Tesla also includes
language that could lead a consumer to believe they have no choice as to
whether their information is shared with certain types of entities.
138
See supra note 135.
139
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 10.
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important because it eradicates any ambiguity as to whether
privacy violations will fall under the current FTC authority within
the FTCA. As discussed in Part II,140 the FTC has relied on case
law to shape the scope of its authority to regulate cybersecurity and
privacy standards. 141 By explicitly stating that the FTC can
prosecute a violation, Congress has given the FTC the power it
needs to operate as a federal enforcement agency as Congress
originally intended.142
D. A Clear Avenue for Industry Input
Another area of concern surrounding the SPY Car Act is the
tension it may generate between the industry participants and the
power of regulation created in the NHTSA and the FTC. This
tension can be seen in other types of industries, such as the current
vehicle industry, and the self-driving vehicle industry should not,
theoretically, have much of a problem with government
oversight.143 The SPY Car Act refers to industry “best security
practices” and addresses how the self-driving vehicle industry
should use these best practices to test the cybersecurity of the
vehicle. 144 Because the technology is still new and relatively
untested, the federal government will need to collaborate with the
industry so the regulations reflect the actual best practices of the
industry and the safest measures for the consumer.
The SPY Car Act initiates this public collaboration by
requiring the FTC to issue regulations “in accordance with section
553 of title 5, United States Code.”145 This particular rulemaking
statute would require the FTC to publish a notice of proposed rule
making in the Federal Register, and the notice must include
140

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Regulation of cybersecurity under the unfairness prong is the prong that is
being challenged more often. Regulation of privacy standards under the
deceptive prong is relatively settled, and most companies charged with a
violation of their privacy policy will typically settle with the FTC and pay civil
penalties. See supra note 78.
142
See Liebling, supra note 66, at 283.
143
See RAND, supra note 4, at XXII.
144
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 4.
145
Id. at 10–11; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
141
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logistical details for public hearings on the rule, the “legal
authority” proposing the rule, and the subject matter covered by
the rule. 146 These statutory requirements will give the FTC an
opportunity to interact with the industry participants and obtain
valuable information from them, which, in turn, will improve the
quality of final regulations published by the FTC. 147 Strictly
following the statutory guidelines, however, may not be enough to
illicit adequate input from the average consumer interested in
owning a self-driving vehicle.148
An effective way to obtain industry and consumer input on
privacy regulations is, in addition to following the statutory
requirements laid out in 5 U.S.C. § 553, to create a webpage under
the FTC and NHTSA government websites so consumers and
industry players can comment on what seems to work and what
does not work for privacy regulations. This webpage could be
updated with proposals from the FTC and NHTSA and allow
comments on those particular proposals before implementing them.
The prevalence of self-driving vehicles is evidence that society is
becoming increasingly technologically advanced.149 Therefore, the
FTC should use a more technologically advanced solution for
obtaining valuable input from consumers such as a website or
social media postings about proposals and rules.
E. Lack of Redress for Consumers
One staggering deficiency in the SPY Car Act is the lack of
redress for consumers. The FIPs speak to the importance of redress
and how there are multiple ways to seek redress and enforcement
146

5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 21, at 49–50. Although the
U.S. DOT is analyzing NHTSA rulemaking the analysis is the same for the
proposed rulemaking for the FTC under the SPY Car Act. The U.S. DOT states
that “[r]ulemaking generally takes the longest . . . but it enables the Agency to
make the broadest and most thorough changes to governing regulations, and
gives the public the greatest opportunity to participate in the Agency’s decisionmaking process.” Id.
148
See generally Richard Williams, Regulation Checklist: Common Pitfalls in
Regulations (George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 10-01, 2010).
149
See Max Roser, Technological Progress, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2016),
https://ourworldindata.org/technological-progress/.
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for consumers could be established.150 The most effective way to
do so would be to establish “private rights of action for consumers
harmed by an entity’s unfair information practices.”151 The FTC
states that creating private remedies for consumers there would
provide “strong incentives for entities to adopt and implement” the
FIPs and would “ensure compensation for individuals harmed by
misuse of their personal information.”152 The specific form of these
remedies would be something that would need to be expanded
upon later; just adding redress language to the SPY Car Act could
strengthen the self-driving vehicle industry and could lead to
increased consumer comfort in buying a self-driving car.
A remedy for breach of the privacy standards, however, would
fall under the powers of the FTC under the FTCA to “seek
consumer redress from the” company who caused the injury to the
consumer.153 Therefore, it does not seem that it would be difficult
to pursue redress on behalf of consumers who were injured by a
self-driving vehicle manufacturer that has breached its privacy
policy because that area of the FTC’s authority is so settled.
However, there may be an issue as to what types of redress would
be associated with a breach of the vehicle’s cybersecurity, which
carries higher risk of injury. Even though the SPY Car Act does
not address a specific remedy for consumers, by making a breach
of the privacy standards an “unfair and deceptive act or practice”
under the FTCA, Congress has effectively created a type of
remedy for consumers operating through the FTC.154
V.
CONCLUSION
The SPY Car Act is an effective first step in establishing
industry standards for self-driving vehicle security and privacy.
There are many questions left unanswered, and this intersection
between technology and the law presents a unique challenge to
lawmakers, industry participants, and consumers. The SPY Car
150

See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 38, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
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Act does many things well, and due to the complete lack of
existing regulations, the SPY Car Act creates the necessary avenue
for the federal government to catch up to self-driving technology.
Among the positive aspects of the SPY Car Act, it ensures that
manufacturers abide by certain rules and regulations by attaching
civil penalties to violations155 and more closely follows the original
FIPs promulgated by the FTC. The SPY Car Act also provides
consumers with an avenue for redress against companies that
violate their stated privacy policies. The high value of the
information these self-driving vehicles will contain calls for a
stringent system of governance over self-driving vehicle
manufacturers, and by making a violation of the privacy standards
contained in the SPY Car Act fall under the prosecutorial authority
of the FTC, Congress has provided the FTC with the power it
needs to govern this technology.
The SPY Car Act says that its purpose is to “protect consumers
from security and privacy threats to their motor vehicles” and the
SPY Car Act does make an adequate attempt to do this.156 The SPY
Car Act does many things well; nonetheless, Congress needs to
address its negative attributes with expediency. The disconnect
between the industry and those that seek to regulate the industry
must be addressed. Without communication between key industry
players and government regulators, these self-driving vehicles
could create an insurmountable burden that could prevent the
industry from ever crossing the starting line. The notice of
proposed rulemaking is a very good tool the FTC can use to
effectuate communication between the industry, government, and
consumers. This notice of proposed rulemaking needs to be
bolstered by a more technologically advanced method of
commenting on proposed rules. By making the rulemaking process
more user friendly, the FTC could illicit more helpful input from
consumers, and a greater number of consumers would have an
opportunity to have their voice heard.
Overall, the SPY Car Act has the potential to help standardize
practices that desperately need cohesion. From consumers’ rights
155
156

Id. at 5, 10.
SPY Car Act, supra note 8, at 1.

APRIL 2017]

Your Car Act

243

to the industry’s business interests to the government’s regulatory
interests, the issue of self-driving vehicle technology is far from
being resolved. It is going to take a concerted effort among
consumers, the industry, and the government to create unassailable
vehicles that are safe and protect consumer privacy. After all, the
benefits of these vehicles have the potential to shape the future of
transportation for the United States.

